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Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in
which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting
to study conditions under which a coordination or cooperation of interacting entities will occur, be
it spins, particles, bacteria, animals, or humans. Here, we analyze the case, where the entities are
heterogeneous, particularly the case of two populations with conflicting interactions and two possi-
ble states. For such systems, explicit mathematical formulas will be determined for the stationary
solutions and the associated eigenvalues, which determine their stability. In this way, four different
types of system dynamics can be classified, and the various kinds of phase transitions between them
will be discussed. While these results are interesting from a physics point of view, they are also
relevant for social, economic, and biological systems, as they allow one to understand conditions for
(1) the breakdown of cooperation, (2) the coexistence of different behaviors (“subcultures”), (3) the
evolution of commonly shared behaviors (“norms”), and (4) the occurence of polarization or conflict.
We point out that norms have a similar function in social systems that forces have in physics.
I. INTRODUCTION
Game theory is a theory of interactions, which goes
back to von Neumann [2], one of the superminds of quan-
tum mechanics. It is is based on mathematical analyses
[3–6] and methods from statistical physics and the the-
ory of complex systems [7–11], while applications range
from biology [3, 6] over sociology [12–16] to economics
[2, 16–18]. Physicists have been particularly interested
in evolutionary game theory [3–5, 13, 19], which focuses
on the dynamics resulting from the interactions among
a large number of entities. These could, for example, be
spins, particles, bacteria, animals, or human beings. For
such systems, one can calculate the statistical distribu-
tion of states in which the entities can be. These states
reflect, for example, the location in space [20, 21] and/or
whether a spin is oriented “up” or “down” [22, 23], while
in non-physical systems, the states represent decisions,
behaviors, or strategies. In such a way, one can study
problems ranging from the spontaneous magnetization
in spin glasses [22, 23] up to the emergence of behav-
ioral conventions [7, 24, 25]. Further application areas
are nucleation processes [26, 27], the theory of evolution
[3, 28–30], predator-prey systems [31, 32] and the sta-
bility of ecosystems [32–35]. Physicists have also been
interested in the effects of spatial interactions [36–38] or
network interactions [39–46], of mobility [20, 21, 47–51]
or perturbations [21, 51–54].
Recently, particular attention has been paid to the
emergence of cooperation in dilemma situations [6, 55],
which are reflected by a number of different games char-
actarized by different types of interactions [4]: In the stag
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hunt game (SH), cooperation is risky, in the snowdrift
game (SD), free-riding (“defection”) is tempting, while
both problems occur in the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) [38].
Details will be discussed in Sec. IV B. Most of the re-
lated studies have assumed homogeneous populations so
far (where every entity has the same kind of interactions).
Here, we will study the heterogeneous case with multi-
ple interacting populations. Compared to previous con-
tributions for multiple populations [4, 24, 56–58], we will
focus on populations with conflicting interests and dif-
ferent power. Furthermore, we will classify the possible
dynamical outcomes, and discuss the phase transitions
when model parameters cross certain critical thresholds
(“tipping points”).
Our paper is structured as follows: Section II intro-
duces the game-dynamical replicator equations for mul-
tiple interacting populations. Afterwards, Sec. II A spec-
ifies the payoff matrices representing conflicting interac-
tions. While doing so, we will take into account the (po-
tentially different) power of populations. Then, Sec. III
derives the stationary solutions of the evolutionary equa-
tions and the associated eigenvalues, which determine the
instability properties of the stationary solutions. This is
the basis of our classification. Section IV collects and
discusses the main results regarding the dynamics of the
system and possible phase transitions when model pa-
rameters are changing. It also offers an interpretation of
the formal theory. Finally, Sec. V presents a summary
and outlook.
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2II. GAME-DYNAMICAL REPLICATOR
EQUATIONS FOR INTERACTING
POPULATIONS
In the following, we will formulate game-dynamical
equations for multi-population interactions [4, 24, 56–58].
For this, we will distinguish different (sub-)populations
a, b, c ∈ {1, . . . ,A} and various states (behaviors, strate-
gies) i, j, k ∈ {1, . . . , I}. If an entity of population a char-
acterized by state i interacts with an entity of population
b characterized by state j, the outcome (“success”) of the
interaction is quantified by the “payoff” Aabij . Now, let
fa ≥ 0 with
∑
a fa = 1 be the fraction of entities belong-
ing to population a and pai (t) ≥ 0 with
∑
i p
a
i (t) = 1 the
proportion of entities in population a characterized by
state i at time t. We will assume that entities take over
(copy, imitate) states that are more successful in their
population in accordance with the proportional imitation
rule [24, 59]. Moreover, when the interaction frequency
with entities of population b characterized by state j is
fbp
b
j (i.e. proportional to the relative size or “power” fb of
that population and the relative frequency pbj of state j in
it), we find the following set of coupled game-dynamical
equations [24]:
dpai (t)
dt
= pai (t)
[
Eai (t)−Aa(t)
]
. (1)
Herein, the “expected success”
Eai (t) =
A∑
b=1
I∑
j=1
Aabij fbp
b
j(t) (2)
of entities belonging to population a characterized by
state i is obtained by summing up the payoffs Aabij over all
possible states j of interaction partners and populations
b, weighting the payoffs with the respective occurrence
frequencies fbp
b
j(t). (Note that
∑
b
∑
j fbp
b
j(t) = 1.) The
quantity
Aa(t) =
I∑
k=1
pak(t)E
a
k(t) (3)
is the average success in population a and
〈A〉 =
A∑
a=1
faAa(t) (4)
the average success in all populations. The above game-
dynamical equations assume that population sizes (and
the population an entity belongs to) do not change.
Comparing the above game-dynamical equations with
the usual replicator equation for the one-population case,
we have additional terms involving payoffs Aabij from in-
teractions with different populations b 6= a. They lead to
a mutual coupling of the replicator equations (1). Asym-
metrical games with different payoff matrices of the in-
teracting entities, or games between entities with differ-
ent sets of states (strategy sets) are examples for the
Figure 1: (Color Online) Illustration of the outcomes of sym-
metrical 2 × 2 games as a function of the payoff-dependent
parameters ba = B and ca = C, if f = 0.8 (i.e. 80% of in-
dividuals belong to population 1) and if the entities interact
within their own population, but different populations do not
have any interactions between each other (Ba = 0 = Ca)
[4, 23]. p = p11 is the fraction of entities of population 1 in
state 1 and q = p22 the fraction of entities of population 2 in
state 2. The vector fields show (dp/dt, dq/dt), i.e. the direction
and size of the expected change of the distribution (p, q) of
states with time t. Sample trajectories illustrate some repre-
sentative flow lines (p(t), q(t)) as time t passes. The flow lines
move away from unstable stationary points (empty circles).
Saddle points (crosses) are attractive in one direction, but
repulsive in another. Stable stationary points (black circles)
attract the flow lines from all directions. Each color (grey
shade) represents one basin of attraction. It subsumes all
initial conditions (p(0), q(0)) leading to the same stationary
point [yellow = (1,1), green = (1,0), blue = (0,1), red = (0,0),
turquoise = (p0, p0) with p0 = |B|/(|B|+ |C|)]. Solid red lines
indicate the thresholds at which continuous (“second-order”)
phase transitions take place, i.e. at which the system behavior
changes qualitatively (characterized by the appearance or dis-
appearance of stationary points), while the stable stationary
points change continuously when the parameters are varied.
Dashed lines indicate an abrupt change of a stable station-
ary point, i.e. a discontinous (“first-order”) phase transition.
For multi-population prisoner’s dilemmas (MPD), we have
B < 0 and C < 0, and the final outcome is (p, q) = (0, 0).
For multi-population snowdrift games (MSD), we have B > 0
and C < 0, and the stable stationary solution corresponds to
a coexistence of a fraction p0 = |B|/(|B| + |C|) of entities in
one state and a fraction 1 − p0 of entities in the other. For
multi-population harmony games (MHG), we have B > 0 and
C > 0, and the eventually resulting outcome is (1,1). Finally,
for multi-population stag hunt games (MSH), we have B < 0
and C > 0, and there is a bistable situation, i.e. it depends on
the initial fraction of entities in a state, whether everybody
ends up in this state or in the other one [23].
3need to distinguish between different populations. Within
the framework of game-dynamical equations they can
be treated as bimatrix games [3–5]. These, however, do
not consider interactions among entities belonging to the
same population (“self-interactions”), which are reflected
by the payoff matrices Aaaij . The above multi-population
replicator equations include interactions both within the
same population and between different populations. The
significantly different dynamics and outcomes when in-
teractions between two populations are neglected or when
self-interactions are neglected become obvious when Figs.
1 and 2 are compared with Fig. 3.
Figure 2: (Color Online) Illustration of the outcomes as a func-
tion of the payoff-dependent parameters Ba = B and Ca = C,
if f = 0.8 (i.e. 80% of the entities belong to population 1)
and if the entities do not interact within their own popula-
tion (ba = 0 = ca), while entities belonging to different pop-
ulations have interactions with each other [4]. Small arrows
illustrate again the vector field (dp/dt, dq/dt) as a function of
p = p11 and q = p
2
2. Black circles represent stable fix points,
empty circles stand for unstable fix points, and crosses repre-
sent saddle points. The basins of attraction of different stable
fix points are represented in different grey shades (colors) [yel-
low = (1,1), green = (1,0), blue = (0,1), red = (0,0)]. Solid red
lines indicate the thresholds at which continuous phase tran-
sitions take place, dashed lines indicate discontinous phase
transitions. For multi-population prisoner’s dilemmas (MPD),
we have B < 0 and C < 0, for multi-population snowdrift
games (MSD), we have B > 0 and C < 0, for multi-population
harmony games (MHG), we have B > 0 and C > 0, and for
the multi-population stag hunt game (MSH), we have B < 0
and C > 0.
For reasons of simplicity and analytical tractability, we
will now focus on the case of two populations (A = 2)
with two states each (I = 2). This allows one to reduce
the number of variables by means of the normalization
conditions f1 = 1 − f2, p12(t) = 1 − p11(t) and p21(t) =
1− p22(t). Furthermore, we find
E11(t)−A1(t) = E11(t)− p11(t)E11(t)− [1− p11(t)]E12(t)
= [1− p11(t)][E11(t)− E12(t)] . (5)
When evaluating the expected success Eai (t), we will
write the payoff matrices Aabij for population a = 1 as
(A11ij ) =
(
r1 s1
t1 p1
)
and (A12ij ) =
(
R1 S1
T1 P1
)
. (6)
A. Specification of Conflicting Interactions
To reflect conflicting interactions, the payoffs in popu-
lation a = 2 are assumed to be inverted (“mirrored”), i.e.
state 2 plays the role in population 2 that state 1 plays
in population 1:
(A21ij ) =
(
P2 T2
S2 R2
)
and (A22ij ) =
(
p2 t2
s2 r2
)
. (7)
With the abbreviations p(t) = p11(t) and q(t) = p
2
2(t),
this leads to
E11(t) = r1fp(t) + s1f [1− p(t)]
+ R1(1− f)[1− q(t)] + S1(1− f)q(t) (8)
and
E12(t) = t1fp(t) + p1f [1− p(t)]
+ T1(1− f)[1− q(t)] + P (1− f)q(t) . (9)
The parameter f = f1 represents the (relative) power of
population 1, and (1 − f) = f2 the power of population
2. Inserting Eqs. (8) and (9) into Eqs. (5) and (1), the
game-dynamical equation for population 1 becomes
dp(t)
dt
= p(t)[1− p(t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
saturation factors
F
(
p(t), q(t)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth factor
(10)
with F (p, q) = E11 − E12 . Explicitly, we have
F (p, q) = b1f+(c1−b1)fp+C1(1−f)+(B1−C1)(1−f)q ,
(11)
where
b1 = s1−p1, c1 = r1−t1, B1 = S1−P1, C1 = R1−T1 .
(12)
The supplementary equation for population 2 reads
dq(t)
dt
= q(t)[1− q(t)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
saturation factors
G
(
p(t), q(t)
)︸ ︷︷ ︸
growth factor
(13)
with
G(p, q) = b2(1−f)+(c2−b2)(1−f)q+C2f+(B2−C2)fp .
(14)
It is obtained by exchanging p and q, f and 1−f , and in-
dices 1 and 2. The first factors may be interpreted as sat-
uration factors, as they limit the proportions p and q to
the admissible range from 0 to 1. The factors F (p, q) and
G(p, q) can be interpreted as growth factors, if greater
4than zero (or as decay factors, if smaller than zero). Note
that the above two-population game-dynamical equa-
tions are general enough to capture all possible 2 × 2
games and even situations when entities of different pop-
ulations play different kinds of games (“asymmetrical”
case).
B. Special Cases
If there are no interactions between entities of different
populations, we have Ba = 0 = Ca. In that case, both
populations separately behave as expected in the one-
population case (see Fig. 1 and Movie 1 [1]). Instead, if
there are interactions between both populations, but no
self-interactions, we have ba = 0 = ca. In that situation,
we end up with conventional bimatrix games (see Fig. 2
and Movie 2 [1]). In the following, we will assume that
everyone has interactions with entities of all populations
with a frequency that is proportional to the relative pop-
ulation sizes. For simplicity, we will furthermore focus on
the case where the payoffs depends only on the state, but
not the population of the interaction partner. Then, we
have pa = Pa = P , ra = Ra = R, sa = Sa = S, and
ta = Ta = T , i.e.
ba = Ba = B = S − P (15)
and
ca = Ca = C = R− T (16)
(see Fig. 3 and Movie 3 [1]). If the interaction rate be-
tween different populations is ν times the interaction rate
within the own population, we have the more general re-
lationship Ba = νba = νB and Ca = νca = νC (where
the parameter ν > 0 allows us to tune the interaction
frequency between two populations—until now, we have
assumed ν = 1). In that case, we obtain
F (p, q) = Fν(p, q) = B [f(1− p) + ν(1− f)q]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ C [fp+ ν(1− f)(1− q)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
(17)
and
G(p, q) = Gν(p, q) = B [(1− f)(1− q) + νfp]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
+ C [(1− f)q + νf(1− p)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
. (18)
Note that one can restrict the analysis of the two-
population game-dynamical equations to f ≥ 0.5, as the
transformations f ↔ (1 − f) and p ↔ q leave the two-
population replicator equations unchanged.
III. STATIONARY SOLUTIONS,
EIGENVALUES, AND POSSIBLE SYSTEM
DYNAMICS
In the two-dimensional space defined by the variables p
and q, the qualitative properties of the vector field (which
determines the temporal changes dp/dt and dq/dt) can
be completely derived from the stationary solutions and
their stability properties, which are given by their eigen-
values. These can be calculated analytically, i.e. there are
exact mathematical formulas for them.
A. Basic Definitions
For an interdisciplinary readership, we will shortly de-
fine some relevant terminology here, while specialists may
directly continue with subsection B. A stationary solution
(pl, ql) is defined as a point with dp/dt = 0 and dq/dt = 0,
which implies
pl(1− pl)F (pl, ql) = 0 and ql(1− ql)G(pl, ql) = 0 .
(19)
Besides calculating the stationary solutions, one may per-
form a so-called “linear stability analysis”, which allows
one to find out how a solution
(p(t), q(t)) = (pl + δpl(t), ql + δql(t)) (20)
in the vicinity of a stationary solution (pl, ql) evolves in
time. If the distance
dl(t) =
√
δpl(t)2 + δql(t)2 (21)
goes to zero, which may be imagined as an attraction to-
wards the stationary solution, one speaks of a stable sta-
tionary point or an asymptotically stable fix point or an
evolutionary equilibrium [13] (which is a so-called Nash
equilibrium). Its basin of attraction is defined by the set
of all initial conditions (p(0), q(0)), for which the trajec-
tories (p(t), q(t)) starting in these points end up in the
fix point under consideration as time t goes to infinity.
(In Figs. 1–5 and Movies 1–3 [1], they are represented by
different background colors.)
If the distance dl(t) grows rather than shrinks with
time t, one speaks of an unstable fix point. This may
be imagined like a repulsion from the stationary solu-
tion. If the growth or shrinkage of the distance dl is
a matter of the specific choice of the initial conditions
p(0) = pl + δpl(0) and q(0) = ql + δql(t), the station-
ary point is called a saddle point. A saddle point is at-
tractive in one direction, but repulsive in another one.
In Figs. 1–5 and Movies 1–3 [1], the stationary points
and their respective stability properties (marked by cir-
cles and crosses) have been determined analytically. They
fit perfectly to the numerically calculated vector fields,
which represent (dp/dt, dq/dt), i.e. the size and direction
of changes in the distribution (p, q) of states with time.
5Figure 3: (Color Online) Illustration of the parameter-dependent types of outcomes as a function of the payoff-dependent
parameters Ba = ba = B and Ca = ca = C, if f = 0.8 (i.e. 80% of the entities belong to population 1) and if the entities have
interactions with other entities, independently of the population they belong to. This corresponds to the multi-population case
with interactions and self-interactions. Small arrows illustrate the vector field (dp/dt, dq/dt) as a function of p and q. Empty
circles stand for unstable fix points (repelling neighboring trajetories), black circles represent stable fix points (attracting
neighboring trajectories), and crosses represent saddle points (i.e. they are attractive in one direction and repulsive in the
other). The basins of attraction of different stable fix points are represented in different shades of grey (colors) [red = (0,0),
green = (1,0), blue = (0,1), yellow = (1,1), salmon = (u, 0), mustard = (v, 1), where 0 < u, v < 1]. Solid red lines indicate the
thresholds at which continuous phase transitions take place, dashed lines indicate discontinous phase transitions. For multi-
population prisoner’s dilemmas (MPD), we have B < 0 and C < 0, for multi-population snowdrift games (MSD), we have
B > 0 and C < 0, for multi-population harmony games (MHG), we have B > 0 and C > 0, and for the multi-population stag
hunt game (MSH), we have B < 0 and C > 0.
B. Calculation of the Stationary Solutions and
their Eigenvalues
We will now identify the stationary solutions (pl, ql)
satisfying dp/dt = 0 and dq/dt = 0 and their respective
eigenvalues λl and µl. Using the notation p(t) = pl +
δpl(t) and q(t) = ql + δql(t), the eigenvalues follow from
the linearized equations
d
dt
(
δpl(t)
δql(t)
)
=
(
M11 M12
M21 M22
)(
δpl(t)
δql(t)
)
(22)
with
M11 = (1− 2pl)F (pl, ql) + pl(1− pl)(c1 − b1)f ,
M12 = pl(1− pl)(B1 − C1)(1− f) ,
M21 = ql(1− ql)(B2 − C2)f , (23)
M22 = (1− 2ql)G(pl, ql) + ql(1− ql)(c2 − b2)(1− f) .
As the eigenvalue analysis of linear systems of differential
equations is a standard procedure [13], we will not explain
it here in detail. We just note that the eigenvalues λl
and µl of a stationary point (pl, ql) are given by the two
6solutions of the so-called characteristic polynomial
(M11 − λl)(M22 − µl)−M12M21 = 0 . (24)
For the four stationary points (pl, ql) with l ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}
discussed below, we have pl, ql ∈ {0, 1}, which implies
M12M21 = 0. Therefore, the first associated eigenvalue is
just
λl = M11 = (1− 2pl)F (pl, ql) , (25)
and the second associated eigenvalue is
µl = M22 = (1− 2ql)G(pl, ql) . (26)
The following paragraph is again written for an inter-
disciplinary readership, while specialists may skip it. If
both eigenvalues are negative, the corresponding station-
ary point (pl, ql) is a stable fix point, i.e. “trajectories”
(p(t), q(t)) in the neighborhood (flow lines) are attracted
to it in the course of time t. If λl and µl are both positive,
the stationary solution will be an unstable fix point, and
close-by trajectories will be repelled from it. If one eigen-
value is negative and the other one is positive, closeby
trajectories are attracted in one direction, while they are
repelled in another direction. This corresponds to a sad-
dle point. If both eigenvalues are positive, closeby tra-
jectories are repelled from the stationary solution. That
situation is called an unstable fix point.
Let us now turn to the discussion of the stationary
solutions of Eqs. (10) and (13) with the specifications
(11) and (14):
• For the stationary solution (p1, q1) = (0, 0), we have
the associated eigenvalues λ1 = b1f+C1(1−f) and
µ1 = b2(1− f) + C2f .
• The point (p2, q2) = (1, 1) is also a stationary solu-
tion and has the eigenvalues λ2 = −[c1f+B1(1−f)]
and µ2 = −[c2(1− f) +B2f ].
• The stationary solutions (p3, q3) = (1, 0) and
(p4, q4) = (0, 1) exist as well. They have the eigen-
values λ3 = −[c1f+C1(1−f)], µ3 = b2(1−f)+B2f
and λ4 = b1f +B1(1−f), µ4 = −[c2(1−f)+C2f ].
• If 0 ≤ pk ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ qk ≤ 1 with
p5 =
b1f + C1(1− f)
(b1 − c1)f , (27)
p6 =
b1f +B1(1− f)
(b1 − c1)f , (28)
q7 =
b2(1− f) +B2f
(b2 − c2)(1− f) , (29)
q8 =
b2(1− f) + C2f
(b2 − c2)(1− f) , (30)
we additionally have stationary points (p5, q5) =
(p5, 0) with F (p5, 0) = 0, (p6, q6) = (p6, 1) with
F (p6, 1) = 0, (p7, q7) = (1, q7) with G(1, q7) = 0,
and/or (p8, q8) = (0, q8) with G(0, q8) = 0. These
have the associated eigenvalues
λ5 = p5(1− p5)(c1 − b1)f, µ5 = G(p5, 0) , (31)
λ6 = p6(1− p6)(c1 − b1)f, µ6 = −G(p6, 1) , (32)
λ7 = −F (1, q7), µ7 = q7(1−q7)(c2−b2)(1−f) , (33)
λ8 = F (0, q8), µ8 = q8(1−q8)(c2−b2)(1−f) . (34)
• Inner stationary points (p9, q9) with 0 < p9 < 1,
0 < q9 < 1 can only exist, if F (p9, q9) = 0 =
G(p9, q9) can be satisfied.
C. Special Case of Homogeneous Parameters
Let us now focus on the case of homogeneous param-
eters given by ba = Ba = B and ca = Ca = C. In this
case, the condition F (p9, q9) = 0 = G(p9, q9) for an inner
point can only be fulfilled for B+C = 0. If B = −C, one
finds a line
q(p) =
1/2 + f(p− 1)
1− f (35)
of fix points, which are stable for B > 0, but unstable
for B < 0. Otherwise, fix points are only possible on the
boundaries with either p or q ∈ {0, 1}.
Evaluating the conditions 0 ≤ pl ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ql ≤ 1
reveals the following:
• The stationary point (p5, 0) only exists for C < 0 <
B and f ≥ |C|/(B + |C|) or for B < 0 < C and
f ≥ C/(|B|+ C).
• (p6, 1) is a stationary point for C < 0 < B and
f ≥ B/(B + |C|) or for B < 0 < C and f ≥
|B|/(|B|+ C).
• The stationary point (1, q7) only exists for C < 0 <
B and f ≤ |C|/(B + |C|) or for B < 0 < C and
f ≤ C/(|B|+ C).
• (0, q8) is a stationary point for C < 0 < B and
f ≤ B/(B + |C|) or for B < 0 < C and f ≤
|B|/(|B|+ C).
• If both, B and C are positive or negative at
the same time, stationary points (pl, ql) with l ∈
{5, . . . , 8} do not exist.
7IV. OVERVIEW OF MAIN RESULTS
For the special case with ba = Ba = B and ca =
Ca = C, our results depend on the type of game, the
sizes |B| and |C| of the payoff-dependent model param-
eters, and the power f of population 1 (e.g. its relative
strength). They can be summarized as follows: For all
values of the model parameters B, C, and f , all four
corner points (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1) are stationary
solutions. However, if B > 0 and C > 0, the only asymp-
totically stable fix point is (1,1), while for B < 0 and
C < 0, the only stable fix point is (0,0). In both cases,
(1,0) and (0,1) are saddle points, and stationary points
(pl, ql) with l ∈ {5, ..., 8} do not exist, as either the value
of pl or of ql lies outside the range [0, 1], thereby violating
the normalization conditions.
If B < 0 and C > 0, we have an equilibrium selection
problem [23] and find:
• (0,1) and (1,0) are always asymptotically stable fix
points.
• (0,0) is a stable fix point for |C|/|B| < min[f/(1−
f), (1− f)/f ].
• (1,1) is a stable fix point for |C|/|B| > max[f/(1−
f), (1− f)/f ].
If B > 0 and C < 0 we have:
• (1,0) and (0,1) are always unstable fix points.
• (0,0) is a stable fix point for |C|/|B| > max[f/(1−
f), (1− f)/f ].
• (1,1) is a stable fix point for |C|/|B| < min[f/(1−
f), (1− f)/f ].
Moreover, if B and C have different signs, stationary
points (pl, ql) with l ∈ {5, ..., 8} may occur:
• (p5, 0) is a fix point for |C|/(|B| + |C|) ≤ f , i.e.
|C|/|B| ≤ f/(1− f).
• (p6, 1) is a fix point for |B|/(|B| + |C|) ≤ f , i.e.
|C|/|B| ≥ (1− f)/f .
• (1, q7) is a fix point for |C|/(B + |C|) ≥ f , i.e.
|C|/|B| ≥ f/(1− f).
• (0, q8) is a fix point for |B|/(|B| + |C|) ≥ f , i.e.
|C|/|B| ≤ (1− f)/f .
A. Phase Transitions Between Different Types of
System Dynamics
It is natural that a change in the parameters B, C,
and f causes changes in the system dynamics. Normally,
small parameter changes will imply smooth changes in
the locations of fix points, their eigenvalues, the vector
fields, and basins of attraction. However, when certain
“critical” thresholds are crossed, new stable fix points
may show up or disappear in remote places of the pa-
rameter space, which defines a discontinous (first-order)
phase transition. If the locations of the stable fix points
change continuously with a variation of the model pa-
rameters, while the related “dislocation speed” changes
discontinously when crossing certain thresholds, we will
talk of a second-order phase transition. In Figs. 1 to 5,
continuous transitions are indicated by solid lines, while
discontinous transitions are represented by dashed lines.
Analyzing the eigenvalues of the fix points (0,0), (1,0),
(0,1), and (1,1), it is obvious that our model of two pop-
ulations with conflicting interactions shows phase tran-
sitions, when B or C changes from positive to negative
values or vice versa. The stationary point (0,0) is sta-
ble for B < 0 and C < 0, (1,0) and (0,1) are stable for
B < 0 and C > 0, and (1,1) is stable for B > 0 and
C > 0. This implies completely different types of system
dynamics, and the transitions between these cases are
discontinous (corresponding to first-order phase transi-
tions). For B > 0 and C < 0, the stable fix point differs
from the corner points (0,0), (1,0), (0,1), and (1,1), but
its location changes continuously, as B or C crosses the
zero line (corresponding to a second-order transition).
It is striking that conflicting interactions between two
populations lead to further transitions, as f or |C|/|B|
cross certain critical values: Namely, as |C| is increased
from 0 to high values, apart from (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), and
(1,1), we find the following stationary points (given that
B and C have different signs):
• (p5, 0) and (0, q8), if f ≥ 1/2 and |C|/|B| ≤ (1 −
f)/f or if f ≤ 1/2 and |C|/|B| ≤ f/(1− f).
• (p5, 0) and (p6, 1), if f ≥ 1/2 and (1 − f)/f <
|C|/|B| < f/(1−f), or (1, q7) and (0, q8) if f ≤ 1/2
and f/(1− f) < |C|/|B| < (1− f)/f .
• (p6, 1) and (1, q7), if f ≥ 1/2 and |C|/|B| ≥ f/(1−
f) or if f ≤ 1/2 and |C|/|B| ≥ (1− f)/f .
For B < 0 < C, these fix points are unstable or saddle
points, while they are stable or saddle points for C <
0 < B. When the equality sign in the above inequalities
applies, fix points (pl, ql) with l ∈ {5, 6, 7, 8} may become
identical with (0,0), (0,1), (1,0), or (1,1).
Obviously, there are further transitions to a qualita-
tively different system behavior at the points |C|/|B| =
(1 − f)/f and |C|/|B| = f/(1 − f) (see Figs. 3 to 5).
These are continuous, if B > 0 and C < 0, but discon-
tinuous for B < 0 and C > 0. Moreover, there is another
transition, when |C| crosses the value of |B|, as the stabil-
ity properties of pairs of fix points are then interchanged
(see Figs. 3–5 and Movie 3 [1]). If B < 0 and C > 0,
this transition is of second order, as the stable fix points
remain unchanged as the model parameters are varied
(see Fig. 4). However, for B > 0 and C < 0, the tran-
sition is discontinuous (i.e. of first order), because the
stable fix point turns into an unstable one and vice versa
(see Fig. 5). That can be followed from the fact that the
8dynamic system behavior and final outcome for the case
|B| > |C| can be derived from the results for |B| < |C|.
This is done by applying the transformations B ↔ −C,
p ↔ (1 − p), and q ↔ (1 − q), which do not change the
game-dynamical equations
dp
dt
= p(1−p)[Bf(1−p)+Cfp+C(1−f)(1−q)+B(1−f)q]
(36)
and
dq
dt
= q(1−q)[B(1−f)(1−q)+C(1−f)q+Cf(1−p)+Bfp] .
(37)
Figure 4: (Color Online) Illustration of the parameter-
dependent types of outcomes in the multi-population stag-
hunt game, if |C|/|B| and/or f are varied and interaction
between populations as well as self-interactions are consid-
ered. The representation and grey shades (colors) are the same
as in Fig. 3. Solid red lines indicate the thresholds at which
continuous phase transitions take place, dashed lines indicate
discontinous phase transitions.
B. Classification and Interpretation of Different
Types of System Dynamics
We have seen that the stability of the stationary points
and the system dynamics change, when B or C cross
the zero line. Therefore, it makes sense to distinguish
four “archetypical” types of games. Note, however, that
the two types with BC < 0 can be subdivided into six
subclasses each given by
(i) f/(1− f) < |C|/|B| < 1,
(ii) 1 < |C|/|B| < (1− f)/f ,
(iii) |C|/|B| < min(f/(1− f), (1− f)/f),
(iv) |C|/|B| > max(f/(1− f), (1− f)/f),
(v) (1− f)/f < |C|/|B| < 1,
(vi) 1 < |C|/|B| < f/(1− f) (see Figs. 4+5).
That is, the system behavior for conflicting interactions
(see Fig. 3) is clearly richer than for the one-population
case [4, 23] or for two-population cases without interac-
tions (see Fig. 1) or without self-interactions (see Fig. 2).
If BC < 0, the system dynamics additionally depends on
the values of f and |C|/|B|. It may furthermore depend
on the initial condition, if B < 0 and C > 0 (see Figs.
3+4).
Figure 5: (Color Online) Illustration of the parameter-
dependent types of outcomes in the multi-population snow-
drift game, if |C|/|B| and/or f are varied and interaction be-
tween populations as well as self-interactions are considered.
The representation and grey shades (colors) are the same as
in Fig. 3.
While our previous analysis has been formal and ab-
stract, we will now discuss our results in the context of so-
cial systems for the sake of illustration. Then, the entities
are individuals, and the states represent behaviors. With-
out loss of generality, we assume R > P (determining
the numbering and meaning of behaviors) and f ≥ 1/2
(determining the numbering of populations such that the
power of population 1 is the same or greater than the one
of population 2). Moreover, we will use the following ter-
minology: If two interacting individuals show the same
behavior, we will talk about “coordinated behavior”. The
term “preferred behavior” is used for the preferred coor-
dinated behavior, i.e. the behavior which gives the higher
payoff, when the interaction partner shows the same be-
havior. This payoff is represented by R, while the non-
preferred coordinated behavior results in the payoff P .
Furthermore, if a focal individual chooses its preferred
behavior and the interaction partner chooses a different
behavior, the first one receives the payoff S and the sec-
ond one the payoff T . In the so-called prisoner’s dilemma,
R usually stands for “reward”, T for “temptation”, P for
9“punishment”, and S for “sucker’s payoff”. The payoff-
dependent parameter C = R − T may be interpreted
as gain of coordinating on one’s own preferred behav-
ior (if greater than zero, otherwise as loss). Moreover,
B = S − P may be interpreted as gain when giving up
coordinated, but non-preferred behavior.
The conflict of interest between two populations is re-
flected by the fact that “cooperative behavior” is a matter
of perspective: A behavior that appears cooperative to a
focal individual is cooperative from the viewpoint of its
interaction partner only, if belonging to the same popula-
tion, otherwise it is non-cooperative from the interaction
partner’s viewpoint. In the model studied in this paper,
population 1 prefers behavior 1, population 2 behavior
2. Moreover, behavior 1 corresponds to the cooperative
behavior from the viewpoint of population 1, but to the
non-preferred behavior of the interaction partner, i.e. it
is non-cooperative from the point of view of population 2.
Moreover, if two interacting individuals display the same
behavior, their behavior is coordinated. Finally, we speak
of a “behavioral norm” or of “normative behavior”, if all
individuals (or the great majority) show the same (coor-
dinated) behavior [61–64], independently of their behav-
ioral preferences and the (sub-)population they belong
to. It should be stressed that this requires the individ-
uals belonging to one of the populations to act against
their own preferences. See Ref. [60] for the related social
science literature.
Within the context of the above definition, the four
types of system dynamics distinguished above are related
to four types of games discussed in the following:
1. For T > R > P > S we have a multi-population
prisoner’s dilemma (MPD), which corresponds to
the case B < 0 and C < 0. According to the results
in Sec. IV, this is characterized by a breakdown of
cooperation. Accordingly, individuals in both pop-
ulations will end up with their non-preferred be-
havior. This is even true, when the non-negative
parameter ν in the generalized replicator equations
(17) and (18) is different from 1.
2. In contrast, for R > T > S > P we have a multi-
population harmony game (MHG) with B > 0 and
C > 0. In this case, all individuals end up with
their preferred behaviors, but the behavior of both
populations is not coordinated. Considering this co-
existence of different behaviors, one could say that
each population forms its own “subculture”.
3. For R > T > P > S, which implies B < 0 and
C > 0, we are confronted with a multi-population
stag-hunt game (MSH). For most initial conditions,
the system ends up in the stationary states (1,0) or
(0,1). In the first case, both populations coordinate
themselves on the behavior preferred by popula-
tion 1, while in the second case, they coordinate
themselves on the behavior preferred by popula-
tion 2. In both cases, all individuals end up with
the same behavior. In other words, they establish a
commonly shared behavior (a “social norm”). How-
ever, there are also conditions under which differ-
ent behaviors coexist, namely if (1,1) or (0,0) is a
stable stationary point (see yellow and red basins
of attraction in Fig. 4 and in the MSH section of
Fig. 3). Under such conditions, norms are not self-
enforcing, as a commonly shared behavior may not
establish. This relevant case can occur only, if both
populations have interactions and self-interactions.
It should also be noted that norms have a simi-
lar function in social systems that forces have in
physics. They guide human interactions in subtle
ways, creating a self-organization of social order.
See Refs. [50, 60] for a more detailed discussion of
these issues.
4. If T > R > S > P , corresponding to B > 0 and
C < 0, we face a multi-population snowdrift game
(MSD). In this case, it can happen that individu-
als in one of the populations (the stronger one) do
not coordinate among each other. While some of
their individuals show a cooperative behavior, the
others are non-cooperative. We consider this frag-
mentation phenomenon as a simple description of
social polarization or conflict.
Note that, in the multi-population snowdrift game with
B > 0 and C < 0, the stationary point (p5, 0) ex-
ists for f ≥ |C|/(|B| + |C|), and the point (p6, 1) for
f ≥ |B|/(|B|+|C|). If f ≥ 1/2 and (1−f)/f < |C|/|B| <
f/(1 − f), (p5, 0) is a stable fix point for |B| < |C|,
while (p6, 1) is a stable fix point for |B| > |C|, which
implies a discontinuous transition at the “critical” point
|B| = |C|, when |C| is continuously changed from values
smaller than |B| to values greater than |B| or vice versa.
This transition, where all individuals in the weaker pop-
ulation suddenly turn from cooperative behavior from
the perspective of the stronger population to their own
preferred behavior, may be considered to reflect a “rev-
olution”. In the history of mankind, such revolutionary
transitions have occured many times [65].
It turns out to be insightful to determine the average
fraction of cooperative individuals in both populations
from the perspective of the stronger population 1. When
(p5, 0) is the stable stationary point, it can be determined
as the fraction of cooperative individuals in population 1
times the relative size f of population 1, plus the fraction
1− q5 = 1 of non-cooperative individuals in population 2
(who are cooperative from the point of view of population
1), weighted by its relative size (1− f):
p5 ·f + (1− q5)·(1− f) = Bf + C(1− f)
(B − C)f ·f + 1·(1− f)
=
B
B − C =
|B|
|B|+ |C| . (38)
Similarly, if (p6, 1) is the stable stationary point, the frac-
tion of cooperative individuals from the point of view of
10
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p6 ·f + (1− q6)·(1− f) = B
(B − C)f ·f + 0·(1− f)
=
B
B − C =
|B|
|B|+ |C| , (39)
as for q6 = 1, everybody in population 2 behaves non-
cooperatively from the perspective of population 1. Sur-
prisingly, the average fraction of cooperative individu-
als in both populations from the point of view of the
stronger population corresponds exactly to the fraction
p0 = |B|/(|B|+ |C|) of cooperative individuals expected
in the one-population snowdrift game [23]. However, this
comes with an enormous deviation of the fraction q of
cooperative individuals in the weaker population 2 from
the expected value p0 (as we either have q = 0 or
q = 1), and also with some degree of deviation of p
from p0 in the stronger population 1. That is, although
the stronger population in the multi-population snow-
drift game causes an opposition of the weaker population
and a polarization of society [66], the resulting distribu-
tion of behaviors in both populations finally reaches a
result, which fits the expectation of the stronger popu-
lation 1 (namely of having a fraction p0 of cooperative
individuals from the point of view of population 1). One
could therefore say that the stronger population controls
the behavior of the weaker population.
V. SUMMARY AND OUTLOOK
In this paper, we have used multi-population repli-
cator equations to describe populations with conflict-
ing interactions and different power. It turns out that
the system’s behavior is much richer than in the one-
population case or in the two-population case without
self-interactions. Nevertheless, it is useful to distinguish
four different types of games, characterized by a qualita-
tively different system dynamics: The harmony game, the
prisoner’s dilemma, the stag-hunt game and the snow-
drift game. When applied to social systems, the latter
three describe social dilemma situations. However, in
the presence of multiple populations, we may not only
have the dilemma that people may choose not to coop-
erate. Their behaviors in different populations may also
be uncoordinated. Accordingly, the establishment of co-
operation is only one challenge in social systems, while
the establishment of commonly shared behaviors (“social
norms”) is another one. Note that the evolution of social
norms is highly relevant for the evolution of language
and culture [14, 15, 67]. According to our model, it is
expected to occur for multi-population stag hunt inter-
actions. Interestingly, compared to the multi-population
games without self-interactions, we have found several
new subclasses, depending on the power f of populations
and the quotient |C|/|B| of the payoff-dependent param-
eters B and C. The same is true for multi-population
snowdrift games.
Considering the simplicity of the model, the possible
system behaviors are surprisingly rich. Besides the oc-
currence of phase transitions when B and C change their
sign, we find additional transitions when BC < 0 and
the quotient |C|/|B| crosses the values of 1, f/(1 − f),
or (1 − f)/f . We expect an even larger variety of sys-
tem behaviors, if the model parameters are not chosen in
a homogeneous way. For example, one could investigate
cases in which both populations play different games.
Our model can also be extended to study cases of mi-
gration and group selection. This will be demonstrated
in forthcoming publications. It will also be interesting to
compare the behavior of test persons in game-theoretical
lab experiments [68, 69] with predictions of our model
for interacting individuals with conflicting interests. De-
pending on the specification of the interaction payoffs,
it should be possible to find the following types of sys-
tem behaviors: (1) The breakdown of cooperation, (2)
the coexistence of different behaviors (the establishment
of “subcultures”), (3) the evolution of commonly shared
behaviors (“norms”), and (4) the occurence of social po-
larization. In the latter case, one should also be able to
find a “revolutionary transition” as |B|/|C| crosses the
value of 1. While there is empirical evidence that all these
phenomena occur in real social systems, it will be inter-
esting to test whether the above theory has also predictive
power.
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